

AGONY WITHOUT MERCY

(tentative last chapter)

Altho~~gh~~ all the Texas recommendations were feasible, were, indeed, "sound and thorough", the could not be followed without doing some kind of investigation. In the area of Agent Oswald, that was the last thing anybody federal wanted. Carr's proposals were not unusual. They presented no problems of cost, ^{none of law} none of hardship, they were simple and obvious. But that they were so carefully avoided when they ~~represented~~ represent the very least any self-respecting investigation could undertake does not inspire confidence that Oswald was without this kind of history, that the federal government was without so embarrassing a complication.

The Commission did so "consider" them "seriously", for it had to live with them, once Carr put them in writing and while the Texas investigation was unburied. ~~Hereafter~~ Ultimately it evolved a simple formula. It scraped the bottom of the Texas barrel, to appear to be compromising with the Texas suggestions, to be adopting them in part, the result being what the suppressed opinion of January 27 describes as unacceptable to the country.

Hoover~~was called as a witness~~ and W.A. Malone were called as witnesses the same day, May 14, 1964, which just happens to be two weeks before the Commission had hoped preceded, ~~by~~ on May 6, to complete its work. Hoover was ~~represented by~~ ~~represented by~~ Alan A. Belmont, then an assistant director of the FBI. Next to Hoover was his long-time friend Clyde Tolson, with the title Associate Director. Belmont was "in charge of all investigative work". Malone was accompanied by Richard M. Helms, then a Deputy Director, the man who ultimately succeeded Malone as Director.

There were no other CIA witnesses. Only a few of the agents who might have had contact with Oswald or who might have had knowledge of the contact of other agents with him were called as witnesses or provided affidavits, as a substitute to testimony. If affidavits not be neither examined nor cross-examined. In print the testimony the Commission found it expedient to include the Hoover, Malone, Belmont and Helms testimony in a single volume, its fifth, and to see to it that none of the other relevant testimony or evidence of any kind was included in the same volume.

Here is how that "investigation" went.

Some of ~~the members~~ of the Commission staff actually seem to have thought that the Commission really was going to "inx investigate the reports of Oswald as an agent. Although they have since preserved total silence, and those who had doubts during the Commission's life having shifted their since, behind the scenes a number did attempt to get meaningful information, and questions with import. This is reflected in letters drafted for Rankin's signature and staff discussions, none of which were expected to be seen by anyone during the Commission's active days. Over the years, a number of us working together have resurrected ~~them~~ some of them from official oblivion.